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Some reflections on world and





1 In this paper I wish to address the topic of the relationship between spirit (or mind)
and the cosmos (or world) from the perspective of Hans Jonas, who devoted some effort
to clarifying the constitution of the phenomenal domain as being characterized by an a
priori correlation between world and spirit/mind. In particular, I endeavour to show
how, according to Jonas, the process of individuation of life and then spirit/mind is
dynamically related to a pre-individual  cosmic dimension.  Furthermore,  I  intend to
address the following questions: A) How is individuality related to objective reality? In
what  sense  does  the  latter  generate  the  process  of  individuation?  B) How  can  the
anthropological difference be understood without simply reducing it  to idealistic or
naturalistic perspectives? C) Why and in what sense is metaphysics necessary in order
to respond to the cosmological question?
 
What is an individual?
2 At the very beginning of the essay programmatically entitled Biological Foundations of
Individuality Jonas  expresses  dissatisfaction  with  the  two  traditional  ways  of
understanding individuality – namely, on the one hand, the perspective from outside,
according to which matter and then space and time are to be regarded as the principium
individuationis and, on the other hand, the view focusing on the individual’s own form
or essence. Jonas expresses a different point of view and a different methodology of
enquiry: “I wish here to take a stand ‘within’, asking what it is to be an individual – for
the individual itself; and I shall try to expound a concept which makes individuality the
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prerogative  of  a  specific  mode of  existence  and therefore  the  peculiarity  of  beings
endowed with that mode of existing” (Jonas 1974, p 86-187).
3 And thus Jonas reformulates the definition of individuality as follows:
Only those entities are individuals whose being is their own doing (and thus, in a
sense, their task): entities, in other words, that are delivered up to their being for
their being, so that their being is committed to them […]. Entities, therefore, which
in their being are exposed to the alternative of not-being as potentially imminent,
and achieve being in answer to this constant imminence; entities, therefore, that
are temporal  in their  innermost nature,  that have being only by everbecoming,
with each moment posing a new issue in their history; whose identity over time is
thus,  not  the inert  one of  a  permanent substratum,  but  the self-created one of
continuous performance; entities, finally, whose difference from the other, from the
rest of things, is not adventitious and indifferent to them, but a dynamic attribute
of their being, in that the tension of this difference is the very medium of each
one’s maintaining itself in its selfhood by standing off the other and communing
with it at the same time (Jonas 1974, p. 187).
4 So, first of all,  Jonas reframes the issue of individuality according to a methodology
which  highlights  individuation as  a  continuous,  dynamic,  and  to  some  extent
paradoxical, process – a process in which even the observer as such is involved. Then
he delimits the boundaries of individuality by focusing on the organic phenomenon:
My  contention  will  be  that,  on  the  evidence  penetrable  to  us,  the  proposed
conditions are exhibited by organisms and organisms only, but in some measure by
all organisms: that they are integral to organic being as such; and that therefore the
realm of individuality, in all its grades, is coextensive with the biological realm as a
whole (Jonas, 1974, p 87).
 
Outcomes of the enquiry into individuation: ontology,
purposiveness, human being
5 Given  these  preliminary  remarks,  what  are  the  outcomes  of  Jonas’  enquiry  into
individuality? I would like to draw attention to the following points.
6 Firstly, his enquiry aims at answering an ontological issue: What is the individuality of
the living viz. organic individual? Any living being – he answers – is characterised by a
relation of “needful freedom to matter” (Jonas 1966, p. 80). And he explains: “the exercise
of the freedom which the living thing enjoys is rather a stern necessity. This necessity
we call ‘need’, which obtains only where existence is unassured and identity a continual
task” (Jonas 1974, p. 191). And why is this “needful freedom” endowed with ontological
relevance? Precisely because it  highlights with great exactness what it  means for a
living organism to  be an individual:  “the ontological individual requires,  behind the
continuity of form, internal identity as the subject of its existing in actu.  Even ‘form’
itself, i.e. the very structure dynamically securing its own preservation […], must be
deemed to be in the service of that self-related identity. It is the aspect of ‘need’ which
gets us beyond the indifference of the mere form-matter relation” (Jonas 1974, p. 195).
This necessity – concludes Jonas – is the living being’s “need for constant self-renewal,
and thus need for  the matter  required in that  renewal,  and thus need for  ‘world’”
(Jonas 1974, p. 195).
7 In other words, the (organic) individual is that freedom which needs the world in order
to  exist.  This  means  that  the  individual’s  being,  “suspended in  possibility,  is  to  be
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actualized by the use of the world” (Jonas 1974, p. 196). And as a broader ontological
result, metabolism as the basic dynamic of the organic individual plainly evidences that
being is to be understood in terms of a “polarity of being and not-being, of self and world, of
freedom and necessity” (Jonas 1974, p. 196). And as regards the polarity of self and world,
Jonas clarifies for instance that the “challenge of ‘selfhood’ qualifies everything beyond
the boundaries of the organism as foreign and somehow opposite: as ‘world’, within
which, by which, and against which it is committed to maintain itself.  Without this
universal counterpart of ‘other’,  there would be no ‘self’” (Jonas 1974, p.  196).  As a
result, the living being ought to be understood in terms of a dynamics or a dialectical
process of individuation.
8 Secondly, the dialectical process of organic individuality – namely, of life – evidences
not  only  mere  preservation,  but  also  entails  purposiveness or  teleology.  States  Jonas:
“Because of the metabolizing mode of this identity, need is of its very essence and it is
thus with it from the beginning. But the very means evolved to serve this need, such as
perception, locomotion, desire, add new kinds of need to the basic, metabolic one – and
therewith new kinds of satisfaction. This dialectic too is of the essence of life”1. In other
words, the individual embodies a specific mode of being, whose Sosein or distinctive
condition (Jonas 1984,  p.  40;  Jonas 2015,  p.  91)  highlights a  unique dynamics called
purposiveness or teleology, whose full meaning has to be recovered against inadequate
interpretations of the latter:
Spinoza,  with  the  knowledge  of  his  time,  did  not  realize  that  the  conatus to
persevere in being can only operate as a movement that goes constantly beyond the
given state of things. What, in its total effect, appears to be the maintaining of the
given condition, is in fact achieved by way of a continuous moving beyond the given
condition. There is an openness, a horizon, intrinsic to the very existence of the
organic  individual  […].  Its  continuation is  always more than mere preservation.
Organic  individuality  is  achieved  in  the  face  of  otherness,  as  its  own  ever
challenged goal, and is thus teleological (Jonas 1974, p. 197).
9 So, according to Jonas, the process of organic individuation is at the root of the overall
purposive or teleological tendency of life, which can in some sense be referred to as
evolution, although in a peculiar ontological sense (neither merely monistic-Darwinian,
nor  dualistic)2.  All  individuals  share  the  following  definition:  “To  be  an  individual
means  not-to-be-integrated with  the  world  […].  Individuality  implies  discontinuity”
(Jonas 1974, p. 204). However, Jonas also states that “individuality itself is something
that can be present in greater or smaller measure” (Jonas 1974, p. 204), commensurate
with the complexity of the living beings’ biological structure. As a result – concludes
Jonas – shifts on this scale represent “qualitative differences of being” (Jonas 1974, p.
204).
10 The third outcome of Jonas’ enquiry into individuality concerns the specificity of the
human being’s experience of individuation and – as we shall see shortly – the meaning
of its  reflective turn.  Let us go back to Jonas’  account of  the “biological  meaning of
individuality” (Jonas 1974, p.  205) and briefly recall  both its continuity (i.e.  that any
organic individual  is  characterised by a dialectical  process of  individuation) and its
discontinuity (i.e.  that the evolution of life evidences diverse qualitative measures of
individuality). As regards animal life, Jonas states that its discontinuity and difference
from other forms of organic life can be understood as follows:
The  spatial  gap  between  subject  and  object,  which  is  provisionally  spanned  by
perception, is at the same time the temporary gap between need and satisfaction
that is provisionally spanned by emotion (desire) and practically overcome by
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motion.  All  three  modes  [perception,  emotion,  motion]  express  the  mediacy  of
animal being, or the split between self and world – a qualitative widening of the
split which metabolism opened first, and which is thus at the root of life. The lesser
integration of the animal into its environment as compared to the plant, of which
these modes of mediacy bear witness, is a measure of its greater individuality (Jonas
1974, p. 204).
11 And  what  about  the  human  being?  How  can  its  specificity  be  understood?  Jonas
addresses this question through the same methodology of enquiry: like all organisms,
the human being is also characterised by a dialectical dynamics of individuation (self-
world and subject-object split, means of survival and mediacy in order to bridge the
split  etc.);  however,  unlike  other  organisms,  the  process  of  human  individuation
reveals  something  qualitatively  unique.  Jonas’  account  of  the  human  specificity  is
twofold3: A) he highlights the human being’s “image faculty” as the “further degree of
mediacy”  (Jonas  1966,  p.  184)  which  distinguishes  man  from  animals  ;  and  B)  he
evidences a “threshold to a further mediation”, which is achieved thanks to reflection
(Jonas 1966, p. 185). Both image faculty and reflection are understood through the lens
of the individuation process – namely the aforementioned view from ‘within’, which
offers a renewed ontological insight. First, the image faculty:
This new degree lies in the ideative extension of perception […]. The new mediacy
consists  in  the  interposition  of  the  abstracted  and  mentally  manipulable  eidos
between  sense  and  actual  object,  just  as  on  the  level  of  animal  mediacy  the
perception  of  objects  was  interposed  between  the  organism  and  its  primary
environment-relation. Imaging and speaking man ceases to see things directly: he
sees them through the screen of representations of which he has become possessed
by his own previous dealings with objects, and which are evoked by the present
perceptual  content,  impregnating  it  with  their  symbolic charge  (Jonas  1966,  p.
184-185).
12 This feature – concludes Jonas – provides the human being with “an ‘experience’ at a
remove – symbolic experience, in which the world is taken hold of without imposing its
presence” (Jonas, 1966, p. 185).
13 However, “true man”, viz. the human peculiarity, fully appears only thanks to reflection,
which generates a radical turn in the previously analysed dynamics of subjectification
(or individuation) and objectification, which characterises life as such:
The fateful freedom of objectification, which confronts the self with the potential
sum  total  of  the  “other”,  the  “world”,  as  an  indefinite  realm  for  possible
understanding and action, can and eventually must turn back, with its burden of
mediacy, upon the subject itself and make it in turn the object of a relation which
again takes the detour via the eidos. The “form” here involved is different in kind
from those of the whole realm of outwardness, for it concerns the self’s relation to
all outwardness. The new dimension of reflection unfolds, where the subject of all
objectification appears as such to itself and becomes objectified for a new and ever
more self-mediating kind of relation. With the first asking of the question, What is
man’s,  what  is  my  place  and  part  in  the  scheme of  things  ?,  the  self  becomes
engulfed in the distantness in which all things are kept by man and from which
they have to be retrieved in acts of eidetic intentionality (Jonas 1966, p. 185).
14 So Jonas comes to the conclusion that it is “in the gulf opened by this confrontation of
oneself with oneself, and in the exercise of the relation which in some way or other
always has to span the gulf, that the highest elations and deepest dejections of human
experience have their place” (Jonas 1966, p. 187). The dynamic of this experience is to
be understood as a “continuous synthesis and integration into a total image” endowed
with self-reflective significance: “Quaestio mihi factus sum,  ‘a question have I become
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unto me’: religion, ethics, and metaphysics are attempts, never completed, to meet and
answer the question within an interpretation of total reality” (Jonas 1966, p. 187).
15 Thus the human specificity, as with other forms of life, is explained in terms of the
process  of  individuation.  Nevertheless,  it  presents  a  unique  quality  –  namely  self-
reflection – and an essentially unsurpassable ambiguity, which Jonas already explored
in his earlier enquiry into late antique Gnosticism and Christianity4.
 
The cosmological issue
16 However,  I  believe  that  the  human  specificity  underlines  a  further  possibility  of
enquiry  –  one  that  is definitely  relevant  to  the  relationship  between  world  and
individuation. The very last line of the previous quote refers to the human task to meet
and answer the question regarding one’s own constitution “within an interpretation of
total reality”. In this regard, among the relevant questions are the following: How to
understand  the  relationship  between  the  process  of  individuation  resulting  in  the
human being and the sheer materiality of non-living reality? Further, what precedes
matter as such? What about the origins of the cosmos? These questions pertain to the
domain of metaphysics, which, according to Jonas, is one of the distinctive possibilities
of human self-reflection. What does the possibility of metaphysics evidence? It reveals
that the process of individuation, which stems from life’s primeval act of distantiation –
its setting up of opposition between “self” and “world” – results in a radical enquiry
into the ubi consistam of total reality and into the very reason of what exists.
17 Why – we may ask – is this enquiry urgent today?
18 It is urgent since, according to Jonas, the modern mind tends to dismiss the fruitfulness
of this enquiry by providing reductive answers. Jonas does affirm many discoveries of
the modern mind, such as “the passing nature of cultures and societies” (Jonas 1966,
p. 266), “the discovery of Man’s basic historicity” and “the ontological elaboration of
the innermost temporality of  his  being” (Jonas 1966,  p. 267),  and finally the radical
contingency of being and existence, since – states Jonas – “there is no necessity of there
being a world at all” (Jonas 1966, p. 279; Theis 2014, p. 46). Nevertheless, he firmly resists
the temptation, characteristic of the modern mind, of attempting to escape the true
meaning of the metaphysical question ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’
through negation, reduction etc. And consequently, Jonas does not share the modern
tendency  to  draw  nihilistic  ethical  conclusions,  which  appear  to  be  even  more
dangerous and irresponsible in times of technological development (Jonas 1984). On the
contrary, if correctly understood, “this unanswerable question of metaphysics should
protect us from taking existence for an axiom, and its finiteness for a blemish on it or a
curtailment of its right. Rather is the fact of existence the mystery of mysteries” (Jonas
1966, p. 279), and our philosophical efforts should be devoted to clarifying this issue.
Indeed,  according  to  Jonas,  the  mystery  ought  not  to  discourage  our  enquiry  nor
prevent it anyhow, provided that we choose the proper means of investigation. Besides,
precisely  such  an  enquiry  provides  clear evidence  of  the  human  being’s  reflective
uniqueness – as previously detailed.
19 How does Jonas tackle the issue of enquiring into this “mystery of mysteries”, which is
“the fact of existence”? And how does his enquiry shed further light on the dynamics of
individuation and its contribution to cosmology?
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20 We  have  to  analyse  one  of  Jonas’  last  works,  namely  Materie,  Geist  und  Schöpfung:
kosmologischer  Befund und kosmogonische  Vermutung (1988),  which was translated into
English under the title Matter, Mind, and Creation: Cosmological Evidence and Cosmogonic
Speculation (Jonas 1996, p. 165-197). In this essay Jonas puts forward a hypothesis “for
explaining  the  tendency  of  nature,  beginning  from structures  of  a  lower  order,  to
create a higher order such as we know” (Jonas 1996, p. 165). Indeed, the question is:
“From what principle of progress can [the universal matter’s] development – that of
the whole cosmos and then especially that of the Earth up to the most subtle forms of
the  organic  world  –  be  explained?  The  riddle  here  is  the  physically  improbable,
antientropic direction from disorder to order (only the opposite is probable), and from
the lower to the higher” (Jonas 1996, p.  166-167; see also Spinelli  2016,  p.  548-549).
According to Jonas, neither the concept of “cosmogonic logos or information”, which is
ultimately  deterministic,  nor  the  alternative  statement  that  order  derives  from
disorder through natural selection, are convincing (Jonas 1996, p. 167-170).
21 How  to  tackle  the  issue  then?  By  recalling  the  ontological  meaning  of  organic
individuals  (along  with  their  subjectivity/inwardness  and  dynamics  –  Jonas  1996,
p. 170)  and highlighting its  cosmological  significance.  Indeed,  the  very  existence  of
organic  individuals  challenges,  strictly  speaking,  both  dualistic  and  materialistic
interpretations, which are incapable of explaining the specificity of organic beings:
Nevertheless [states Jonas], a monistic solution to our riddle is to be sought, since
the voice of subjectivity in animals and human beings did emerge from the mute
vortex of matter and continues to adhere to it. It is universal matter itself which, in
becoming  inward,  finds  its  voice  in  subjectivity.  Matter’s  most  astounding
accomplishment  may  not  be  denied  it  in  any  account  of  Being.  What  appears
necessary, then, for a monistic solution is an ontological revision and replenishing
of the concept of “matter” beyond the external qualities abstracted from it and
measured by physics;  and this  means,  therefore,  a  meta-physics  of  the material
substance  of  the  world.  In  statements  that  are  just  conjectures,  proposed  to
stimulate further reflection, I will attempt to formulate what has imposed itself on
me after many decades of pondering5.
22 And  what  about  the  results  of  this  reflection?  Let  me  try  to  summarise  Jonas’
cosmological, and then cosmogonic, line of reasoning, whose relevance to the dynamic
of individuation and to the place of the human being in the world Jonas scholars have
so far either not duly recognised or have tended to understand differently6:
23 – Firstly,  cosmic matter is  endowed “with the possibility of  eventual inwardness [i.e.
subjectivity, individuation] – not an endowment with inwardness, still long in coming,
and not even an endowment for inwardness in the sense of being already prepared for
it” (Jonas 1996, p. 172). In other words, matter is endowed with a certain degree of
potentiality.  Two  questions  arise  then:  “Who  (or  what)  ‘endowed’  matter  in  such  a
manner? and, What share did this ‘endowment’ have in the course of cosmic events?
What  we are  raising here  is  the  question of  an initial  creative  will  and its  further
efficacy” (Jonas 1996, p. 172).
24 – Secondly,  as an offspring of that “voice of immanence concerning itself” which is
organic  life  (Jonas  1996,  p.  174),  the  human  specificity  appeared  and  “with  this,
certainly, an horizon of transcendence unfolds. It becomes apparent in three freedoms
of thinking that go beyond everything ascribable to matter (including the dimension of
inwardness), and thus beyond all of ‘nature’” (Jonas 1996, p. 174). These three freedoms
of thinking are: “(1) The freedom of thinking for determining itself through its choice of
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object […]. (2) The freedom to transform the sensuously given into self-created inner
images  […].  (3)  The freedom, finally,  carried by the symbolic  wings  of  language,  to
transcend everything that can ever be said and the dimension of the sayable as such”
(Jonas 1996, p. 174).
25 – Thirdly, the cosmologic evidence provided by the appearance of life and of the human
being  from  matter  leads  up  to  a  cosmogonic  speculation regarding  creation:  “The
existence of inwardness in the universe, and along with it the anthropic evidence of
reason, freedom, and transcendence, are, so we have said, cosmic data. As such they
belong together among the generically indispensable elements of a cosmology. Their
testimony says: the universe is of the kind that such things are possible in it, perhaps
even necessarily flow out of it. Does this also teach us something about its first causes,
about creation?” (Jonas 1996, p. 179).
26 – Fourthly,  Jonas’  assumption  about  creation  pivots  around  the  question:  “Can
something that is less than mind be the cause of mind? We mean here the ‘first’ cause,
the cause at the basis of all things” (Jonas 1996, p. 180), and not simply the secondary
cause. Why does Jonas insist on the centrality of mind? “I speak of mind [Geist] – and
this is more than life and subjectivity. For if we now assert, with a metaphor that might
be  permitted,  that  matter  from  the  very  beginning  is  mind  asleep,  so  we  must
immediately add that the really first cause, the creative cause, of mind asleep can only
be mind awake. From potential mind we must infer actual mind. This is otherwise than
with  living  things  and  subjectivity  as  such,  which,  in  accordance  with  the  gradual
nature of their occurrence, can indeed begin in a sleeping, unconscious manner and yet
require no consciousness in the first cause, in the act of their physical birth. So the
anthropic evidence, then, as part of the cosmic evidence – the self-experience of the
mind, therefore, and especially its reaching out by thinking into the transcendent –
lead us now to the postulate of a mental, thinking, transcendent, supertemporal being
at the origins of things” (Jonas 1996, p. 181).
27 – Fifthly, in order to clarify the cosmogonic event, Jonas proposes an “experimental
and provisional” (Jonas 1966, p. 278) narration in mythical viz. conjectural terms of
what occurred7: “As our first proposition we say that the self-divesting of mind at the
beginning was more serious than the cheerful prophet of reason [i.e. Hegel] was willing
to  admit.  He  [Mind,  the  deity]  abandoned  Himself  and  his  destiny  entirely  to  the
outwardly exploding universe and thus to the pure chances of the possibilities contained
in it under the conditions of space and time. Why He did this remains unknowable. We
are allowed to speculate that it happened because only in the endless play of the finite,
in the inexhaustibility of chance, in the surprises of the unplanned, and in the distress
caused by mortality, can mind experience itself in the variety of its possibilities. For
this  the deity  had to  renounce His  own power” (Jonas  1996,  pp.  189-190).  In  other
words,  God’s  primeval  self-negation  A)  creates  by  letting  be  the  movement  of
individuation/freedom, which is  characterized by natural,  existential,  and historical
dialectics, and at the same time B) prevents Him being subject to the same dialectics
(He is causa prima or primum movens of the latter, although – properly speaking – after
renouncing  His  being,  he  no  longer  exists  qua God).  Thus,  what  Jonas  seems  to
underline here is that God – to say it with Schelling and contrary to Hegel – is the
primeval “indifference” of subjectivity and objectivity, Spirit and Nature etc. Or, to put
it differently, freedom somehow precedes spirit and reason8.
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28 – Finally, according to Jonas, the cosmogonic speculation has a direct impact on ethics:
“God’s  own  destiny,  his  doing  or  undoing,  is  at  stake  in  this  universe  to  whose
unknowing dealings he committed his substance, and man has become the eminent
repository of 
this supreme and every betrayable trust” (Jonas 1966, p. 274). This conjoint event calls
for  human  responsibility,  especially  in  times  of  overwhelming  danger,  such  as  the
present (Jonas mentions the atomic holocaust and the ecological crisis): “the image of
God is in danger as never before, and on most unequivocal, terrestrial terms. That in
these terms an eternal issue is at stake together with the temporal one – this aspect of
our responsibility can be our guard against the temptation of fatalistic acquiescence or
the worse treason of après nous le déluge. We literally hold in our faltering hands the
future of the divine adventure and must not fail Him, even if we would fail ourselves”
(Jonas 1966,  p.  281).  Especially  in times when technology can prodigiously enhance
human freedom of reflection to the extent of erasing its relation to bodily constitution
and the totality of reality (Becchi & Franzini Tibaldeo 2016), ethics ought to remind us
that subjectification and objectification have to be somehow re-connected:  (human)
subjectivity ought to find again its place in the world and to refresh its relationship
with the vulnerable, perishable object of responsibility (Jonas 1984, p. 125-126).
29 In this article I carried out an enquiry into Hans Jonas’ perspective on individuality,
with the aim of clarifying its dynamic and its relevance to the comprehension of the
phenomenon of life. This entailed considering the specificity of the human being’s
place in the world,  since it  is  precisely through human understanding that life and
individuality  are  explained.  However,  the  peculiarity  of  Jonas’  thinking is  that  this
phenomenological  approach  results  in  an  ontological  and  metaphysical  enquiry
endowed with an ethical impact: living beings are characterised by a specific modus
essendi, which is individuality; the same is the case with human beings, although they
reveal  an  additional  feature  –  namely  eidetic  and  reflective  freedom,  the  full
clarification of which requires a speculative and metaphysical investigation into the
essence of reality as such. According to Jonas, the result of this enquiry leads back to
the human being and to the recognition of its ambivalent centrality: on the one hand,
technologically enhanced mankind is a menace to the future of the earthly adventure,
since the latter no longer rests upon an invulnerable ground; on the other hand, the
human being is the only being we know of that is endowed with the awareness and
capability to care for the dynamic of individuation upon which its existence ultimately
rests. The metaphysical conjecture that a ‘transcendent’ meaning reveals itself through
the  history  of  the  cosmos,  the  evolution  of  life,  and  the  appearance  of  mankind,
provides effective backup to Jonas’ endeavour to promote responsibility.
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NOTES
1.  Jonas 1974, p. 196. See also Jonas 1966, p. 90-91, 106. See Becchi & Franzini Tibaldeo, 2016, p.
94.
2.  See Jonas 1966, p. 7-26. See also Jonas 1996, p. 167-170. Recently Lawrence Vogel (2018) has
devoted some effort to clarifying further this aspect of Jonas’ philosophy.
Some reflections on world and individuation in the thinking of Hans Jonas
Alter, 27 | 2019
10
3.  Some scholars dealing with Jonas’ account of the anthropological specificity (Pommier 2013, p.
75-86;  J.  Nielsen-Sikora  2017)  have  focused  on  the  essay  ‘Werkzeug,  Bild  und  Grab’  (English
translation  in  Jonas  1996,  p.  75-86)  rather  than  on  The  Phenomenon  of  Life (chapter  seventh:
‘Image-making  and  the  Freedom of  Man’  [Jonas  1966,  p.  157-182]  and  the  ‘Transition:  From
Philosophy of the Organism to the Philosophy of Man’ [Jonas 1966, p. 183-187]). Others (Schirra &
Sachs-Hombach 2010; Halawa 2011) have tried to use Jonas’ anthropology in order to clarify the
relationship  between  image  faculty  and  language.  As  a  result,  these  scholars  have  either
overlooked  or  misunderstood  the  twofoldness  of  Jonas’  anthropological  account  and  the
relationship between image faculty and (self-)reflection. Whereas others (Rubio 2014) seem to
have accomplished a more convincing interpretation of these issues.
4.  See Jonas 1965; Jonas 1996, p. 177; Jonas 2006; Jonas 2010; Jonas 2017. See also Bonaldi 2010;
Bongardt 2014; Frogneux 2017.
5.  Jonas 1996, p. 171-172. For Jonas’ ontological revision of the notion of matter (Jonas 1966, p. 81;
Jonas 2008,  p.  222),  see especially  Franzini  Tibaldeo 2009;  Theis  2014,  p.  34-39;  Spinelli  2016,
p. 541-542. See also Abe 2015; Spinelli 2019; Theis 2019.
6.  For instance, Marie-Geneviève Pinsart’s (2002) in-depth enquiry into the thinking of Hans
Jonas  begins  with  his  speculative  theology,  which  she  sees  as  providing  the  metaphysical
foundation of his philosophy of freedom, his phenomenology of life, and his ethics. Like Robert
Theis  (2014),  I  choose  instead  the  opposite  hermeneutical  path,  beginning  with  Jonas’
phenomenology of life and ending with his theological-metaphysical and ethical enquiry. For this
there are two main reasons: A) it is indeed Jonas’ aim to go beyond traditional viz. foundational
and static accounts of ontology by benefitting from his “ontological revolution” (Jonas 1966, p.
81; Jonas 2008, p. 222; Franzini Tibaldeo 2009; Theis, 2014) ; B) to assume that Jonas’ speculative
theology provides the metaphysical foundation of his thinking is in some way misleading, since
Jonas’ philosophical reflection does not ultimately rely on religion (see for instance Jonas 2004),
nor can he be classified as a religious thinker, although he does reappraise tradition by making a
philosophical use of religious concepts (Theis, 2014, p. 46; Spinelli 2016; Vogel, 2018).
7.  Robert Theis (2014, p. 46) underlines correctly that Jonas’ use of myth (even when it concerns
ultimate issues, such as creation and God) remains strictly within the boundaries of philosophy,
and never gives rise to a religious belief. Jonas conceived of the myth of the impotent God in the
1960s and in the following decades published several modified versions of it (see for instance
Jonas 1966, p. 275-277, and Jonas 1996, pp. 189-191, which are relevant to the current enquiry; see
also  the  well-known Der  Gottesbegriff  nach  Auschwitz.  Eine  jüdische  Stimme [Jonas  1987]).  Some
scholars, especially Claudio Bonaldi (2007) and Fabio Fossa (2014), have carefully analysed the
evolution of Jonas’ thinking in this regard. See also Spinelli 2016 and Theis 2019, p. 51-56.
8.  In one of the first  reviews of Jonas’  The Phenomenon of  Life ever published Philipp Merlan
acknowledged that “Jonas might have been interested in Schelling’s version of the ‘becoming
God’” (Merlan 1967, p. 278). More recently Fernando Suárez Müller (2013, p. 668) refers to the
same idea, which might have helped Jonas develop an alternative to a Hegelian perspective on
theology.  However,  I  do  not  agree  with Suárez  Müller’s  strictly  intellectualistic  analysis  and
criticism  of  Jonas’  impotent  God  (Suárez  Müller  2013,  p.  669).  On  the  similarities  between
Schelling and Jonas, see Rasmussen, 2018 and Michelini 2020. As a result, I  disagree with the
interpretation proposed by Vittorio Hösle (2001 and 2008), according to which Jonas’ thinking
belongs itself  “to the tradition of objective idealism” (Hösle 2001, p.  42) in that it  ultimately
supports the anteriority of Geist or reason to freedom (Hösle 2001, p. 47).
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